## 1AC

Same as Round 3 – GSU

## 2AC

### Anthro

#### Specific demands are critical – their alternative will get critical

Pascal Bruckner 86, Maître de conférence at the Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris, 1986

(Tears of the White Man)

Here again, though, our analysis must be refined. A universal and angelic and limitless fellowship would be disembodied, insufficient to deal with the misfortunes of any particular category or group of people. Through large-scale institutions, unions, political parties, and associations, I can reinforce and enlarge it to global dimensions, and through them I am obliged to make gestures of abstract charity in the form of food, medicine, and money, to countries whose names I do not know. But we choose our causes as our causes choose us, in an inner encounter with the outside world, in which the world proposes as much as we dispose. This is why we cannot honestly embrace all causes and also why we cannot be disinterested in any of them. When we express concern for Poland, we may be scolded by those who would have us also remember El Salvador, Lebanon, or South Africa. We must reply that a thousand causes for outrage are only so many reasons to do nothing, and that if we are urged not to prefer one struggle over another, East or West or South, we are being pushed toward an involvement that has no limits, which is really complete lack of involvement. It would mean the fairyland of solidarity with no concern. I feel solidarity, period, like some mystical and bloodless love that floats in the air. To be effective, solidarity has to be circumscribed and channeled. Other solidarities can be based on it, but only as aims sought by other people. To be effective, responsibility must choose a limited field of action and a specific geographic area (which is not related to its distance). Without that, it is indeterminate, blind. Our need for political action and sympathy beyond national borders must be tailored to the scale of causes in a particular area, beyond which there is nothing but the hubbub and babbling of the news media. In this respect, too much generosity is suspicious. A fellowship that expresses itself in general terms and that is incapable even of saying the name of those people whom it helps is the solidarity of armchair windbags. It dies of its own purity, from choosing everything. It is nothing but a grandiose slogan, like the postwar label “existentialist,” which was invoked everywhere and anytime. It gives support to the most dissimilar causes with the same enthusiasm. The same people who support the PLO in July with similar arguments, and six months later will support some other guerilla movement. Details are minimized in all cases, and common denominators are sought where historical details should call for exact analyses, strict attention to the facts. It is purely sentimental attachment to people in the outside world, and the Cambodians, Palestinians, and Lebanese all march through the square marked “Victim.”; it is the same preordained ritual for different participants. This kind of solidarity is for mercenaries. of the news media who must impartially cover all the active spots on earth. Let us not ask more of the media than what they already do quite well---make us aware of human problems. Our sort of attachment to the outside world cannot follow the rhythm of the news, even if we do care about it. We must learn to detach ourselves from the hassle of the headlines and hot stories, so we can take root somewhere on earth. Newspapers and television cannot possibly serve as a guide to action because, when the TV screen stops talking about a country, it continues to exist. If we based our attention to the world on the pattern of the news media, we would develop the flexibility of public opinion, which is too apt to take a stand for one group one day and another the next. That is a kind of technological solidarity for the busy ~~man~~ who wastes his effort and spreads ~~him~~self too thinly. A hand held out in this way will soon be pulled back; reflex solidarity provides aid, but then takes it back again.

#### Only nonviolent ethics can ensure the equality of all beings – human and non-human – violence inevitably begets political failure.

May 7 (Todd May is Professor of Philosophy at Clemson University. He is the author of seven books of philosophy, most recently Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction (Cambridge, 2005) and The Philosophy of Foucault (Acumen, 2006), “Jacques Rancière and the Ethics of Equality,” Project Muse)

In political action, the tapestry of this weaving together of cognitive and affective elements around the presupposition of equality has a name, although that name is rarely reflected upon. It is solidarity. Political solidarity is nothing other than the operation of the presupposition of equality internal to the collective subject of political action. It arises in the ethical character of that collective subject, a subject that itself arises only on the basis of its action. When one joins a picket line, or speaks publicly about the oppression of the Palestinians or the Tibetans or the Chechnyans, or attends a meeting whose goal is to organize around issues of fair housing, or brings one's bicycle to a ride with Critical Mass, one is not—if one is engaged in what Rancière calls politics—doing so from a position above or outside those alongside whom one struggles. Rather, one joins the creation of a political subject (which does not mean sacrificing one's own being to it). One acts, in concert with others, on the presupposition of the equality of any and every speaking being. And here is where the justificatory character of the ethics of political action lies. It cannot lie, as we have seen, in an ethical framework that possesses an ultimate foundation. It lies instead in a principle—the presupposition of equality—that can ground and justify political action only to the extent to which it is accepted by those alongside whom and [End Page 33] against whom one struggles. It is, in that sense, an optional ethical principle. But, as we have also seen, this does not mean that it is an arbitrary one. In our world, the presupposition of equality is embedded deep within the ethical framework of most societies. Even when it is honored in the breach, it remains honored. Political action consists in narrowing the breach. There remain two questions to ask about this ethics. The first one is interpretive and can be answered quickly: What is the relationship of this ethics to a vision of contemporary anarchism? The second is normative, and can only be responded to, at least at this moment, with a theoretical gesture: What, if any, implications for the specifics of political action does this ethical framework have? The interpretive question concerns the relation of the ethics of Rancière's politics to anarchism. I hope that the bond between the two will be obvious to those who have either studied or acted within the framework of anarchism. Anarchism's rejection of an avant-garde politics, its concern with the process of political action, its sensitivity to various forms of domination both in society at large and in political communities themselves, and its orientation toward radical equality, are all accounted for in the ethics and politics of the presupposition of equality. What Rancière's work does politically and implies ethically is of a piece with the deepest concerns of much of contemporary anarchism. Moreover, he offers a coherent way to frame those concerns and to bring them forward theoretically. Unlike traditional Marxism, anarchism, in its concern for equality, has often been reluctant to engage in theoretical reflection. If what has been said here is correct, that reluctance is unwarranted. There is much to be understood in politics, and many who can contribute to that understanding. Among what is to be understood is the second question alluded to above: what, if anything, do the ethics of political action imply for the character of political action itself? I would suggest that the pre-supposition of equality among those who act cannot remain limited to those alongside whom one acts. It must also apply to one's adversaries. If those who have no part are to see themselves as equal to those who have a part, then they must also see those who have a part as equal to them. This has implications for political action. I would suggest that such a presupposition of equality among all parties must orient political action toward non-violent means. One must, insofar as possible, refrain from treating those against whom one struggles as beneath consideration, as open game, or as what Kant would call solely a means to one's own ends. This requires political action to be more than just a struggle for [End Page 34] suppression of the adversary, even where the adversary engages in cynical domination. It must be creative in its expression of the presupposition of equality. Nonviolence in politics is often confused with passivity. This is not the place to explain the nature and possibilities of nonviolent action,7 however it must be understood that nonviolence often lies at the opposite pole from political passivity, further away from it than violent resistance. Violent resistance remains in many cases the norm. One is dominated, so one dominates; one is oppressed, so one oppresses. In that sense, violence is always the easy political option. It reverses the power in a relationship. What nonviolence can achieve is something else: not a reversal of power, but an effacing of the terms in which a context of power has been conceived. In the framework of a political orientation whose task is to declassify, nonviolent action carries with it more radical possibilities for declassification than the simple inversion that is the standard consequence of violent resistance. If this line of thinking is right, or even if it is wrong in a fruitful way, then the perspective that Rancière has opened for us is not so much a framework within which we can fit our political thinking as it is a door through which we must walk in order better to reflect upon that thinking. The presupposition of equality opens political thought to new vistas—vistas that, given the history of the last century, should appear more attractive to us now than they might once have done. In this sense, anarchism lies before us rather than behind us, as a political task to be thought and engaged rather than as a historical footnote to be buried alongside other challenges to the pervasive and multifarious dominations of our world.

#### Antiwar activism is a critical starting point for leftist activists- war’s ubiquity makes it the biggest entry point into social justice, comparatively more than other issues.

Heaney and Rojas-prof organizational studies and sociology, Indiana-12 (Antiwar Politics and Paths of Activist Participation on the Left, <http://www.indiana.edu/~workshop/papers/rojas_working%20paper.pdf>)

Charles Tilly (1985) famously argued that war making facilitated state building because wars allow states to expand their tax collecting capacity, which resulted in an expansion of the state itself. The US Social Forum data shows that Tilly's observation can be further developed. In modern America, wars increase movement capacity. Wars touch many sectors of society and are highly emotional events. They disproportionately attract people who are interested in movement activism. Thus, antiwar politics is often the starting point for many activism careers. The aggregate result is that other movements of the left are populated with activists who began as antiwar demonstrators. If the US Social Forum is an indicator of broader trends among progressives, American wars have successfully shifted the left. The lives of activists are now intertwined with antiwar activism.

We do not argue non-peace issues are no longer an important element of the American left. Rather, war making has resulted in a fundamental re-articulation of the relationship between the different social movements that are found in American society. Early in the 20th century, activism was often dominated by "old left" issues, such as labor. In the mid-20th century, the 31 new and old left developed a complex relationship, which at time was competitive and at other times supportive. One strand of civil rights movement scholarship, for example, argues that labor and civil rights were in conflict (Foner 1981; Quadagno 1992). Other scholars have argued that the civil rights movement had a rejuvenating effect on labor unions (Isaac and Chistiansen 2002; Isaac, McDonald and Lukasik 2006). Taken together, this scholarship suggests that old and new social movements co-existed on the same political stage. Major American wars and the post-WWII defense build-up have brought antiwar activism to the forefront of activism. Major wars and other national security issues, such as the deployment of nuclear weapons in the 1980s, created a consistent point of contention, which commanded substantial resources from activists. The persistent effort to combat war has resulted in a situation where the peace movement is ubiquitous and highly connected to other movements. The relationship is asymmetric. The antiwar movement is much more likely to send it recruits to other movements.

#### Public opposition to war works- the public reaction and Obama’s restraint on Syria prove that public opinion can strike quick and fast to constrain the president and war

Richman 13 (Sheldon Richman is vice president and editor at The Future of Freedom Foundation, The People Say No to War … Finally, Sept 13, <http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/09/13/the-people-say-no-to-war-finally/>)

The Constitution did not keep President Obama from attacking Syria. The people did. Think about that. Obama, his top advisers, and many of his partisans and opponents in Congress insist that the president of the United States has the constitutional authority to attack another country without a declaration of war or so-called “authorization for the use of military force” even if that country poses no threat whatever to the United States, the American people, or what are vaguely called “our interests.” This seems wrong, especially in light of the 1973 War Powers Act. But Obama already asserted this alleged authority in Libya. Bill Clinton did it in Kosovo and Bosnia through NATO and the UN. George H.W. Bush did it in Panama. Ronald Reagan did it in Lebanon and Grenada. And so on back to Harry Truman in Korea. (I’m ignoring the many covert wars.) Constitution, Shmonstitution. War Powers, Shmar Powers. Nevertheless, Obama has not bombed Syria (yet). Two weeks ago he told us he had decided to do so, but then he decided to put the question to Congress. After Russia offered to help collect and destroy Syria’s chemical weapons and Bashar al-Assad agreed, Obama asked Congress to delay the vote. What happened? The people happened. Public-opinion polls showed at once that most of us do not want Obama to commit an act of war against Syria. Furthermore, the people inundated Congress with calls and emails. Because of this (and in some cases personal conviction), most members of Congress also do not want war with Syria. Obama got the message: he was heading for sure defeat in the House of Representatives and perhaps in the Senate. He couldn’t bear the prospect of rebuff. Russian president Vladimir Putin gave him a graceful way out. Because the people didn’t want war, when a possible diplomatic solution arose, Obama had to go for it. The people gave him no choice. It’s amusing to listen to the establishment pundits who are appalled that members of Congress are watching opinion polls rather than “exercising leadership” on Syria. Not long ago, many of these same pundits urged members of Congress to heed the polls and pass expanded background checks for gun purchases. I’m looking hard for the principle here, but for the life of me I can’t find it. So the people — not the Constitution — stayed Obama’s hand. There’s a lesson here. No paper constitution ever restrained a government. What ultimately restrains governments is a sufficiently large number of people with certain ideas — an ideology — about the limits to state power. If those ideas change, the power of government will expand or contract, depending on the case, even if no single word of the paper constitution changes. Constitutions don’t interpret or enforce themselves. Methodological individualists know that only persons do such things, and they do them on the basis of their ideology (explicit or implicit). It’s people all the way down. (See my “Where Is the Constitution?”) This doesn’t mean that politicians slavishly obey the people. But politicians do care about elections and are aware that there are limits to state action set by the dominant (tacit) ideology that they cross at their peril. Moreover, government has immense power to shape what people want. It can also obscure what it’s doing, raising the cost of finding out what really goes on, as well as the cost of resisting if the people do find out. (See my review of Charlotte Twight’s book on this subject, Dependent on D.C., and my “Democracy of Dunces,” a review of Bryan Caplan’s The Myth of the Rational Voter.) Étienne de La Boétie, the 16th-century French political philosopher, pointed out what should be obvious: the ruled always outnumber their rulers. In The Politics of Obedience: The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude, he asked, how it happens that so many men, so many villages, so many cities, so many nations, sometimes suffer under a single tyrant who has no other power than the power they give him; who is able to harm them only to the extent to which they have the willingness to bear with him; who could do them absolutely no injury unless they preferred to put up with him rather than contradict him. Surely a striking situation!… Obviously there is no need of fighting to overcome this single tyrant, for he is automatically defeated if the country refuses consent to its own enslavement: it is not necessary to deprive him of anything, but simply to give him nothing; there is no need that the country make an effort to do anything for itself provided it does nothing against itself. It is therefore the inhabitants themselves who permit, or, rather, bring about, their own subjection, since by ceasing to submit they would put an end to their servitude. A people enslaves itself, cuts its own throat, when, having a choice between being vassals and being free men, it deserts its liberties and takes on the yoke, gives consent to its own misery, or, rather, apparently welcomes it. Americans have done a good bit of that over the years, so their stopping this proposed war with Syria is a breath of fresh air, or perhaps it is a small spark of libertarianism that can be fanned into a blaze. It’s worth a try. (See my “Subjugating Ourselves.” Also see Edward Stringham and Jeffrey Rogers Hummel’s “If a Pure Market Economy Is So Good, Why Doesn’t It Exist?”) Yes, war with Syria is still possible. Obama could decide that Putin’s idea was a ploy (maybe it is) and proceed to scare Americans into changing their minds about war. We’ll have to be on guard against that. For the time being, the people say no. The pundits blame “war-weariness” for the public’s opposition. I regard that as an insult. What they mean is that because of our fatigue, we don’t know what we’re saying when we say we don’t want another war. We’re talking nonsense because we aren’t thinking straight. So we should be ignored by the people who, unlike us, are thinking clearly. Apparently, favoring war is a sign of thinking clearly. I don’t believe people are war-weary. Instead, as someone has said (I can’t remember who), they are war-wary. They’ve been burned too many times by their (mis)leaders and (mis)representatives. Ten years ago they were assured with “slam dunk” intelligence that Iraq was a threat because of its WMD. (A few noble reporters debunked these claims.) No WMD were found. Twelve years ago we were told we had to go to war against Afghanistan to protect ourselves from al-Qaeda. The war rages on, and al-Qaeda or its like has spread to Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Mali, Somalia, and other places. Many people have been killed, maimed, and psychologically scarred; over a trillion dollars has been squandered with no end in sight — for what? The military-industrial complex grows fat, and the economy sputters. Americans have had enough, and it’s about time. Their “no” to war is the best news we’ve had in a long time.

### Internal Criticism

#### One speech act doesn’t cause securitization – it’s an ongoing process

**Ghughunishvili 10**

Securitization of Migration in the United States after 9/11: Constructing Muslims and Arabs as Enemies Submitted to Central European University Department of International Relations European Studies In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Supervisor: Professor Paul Roe <http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2010/ghughunishvili_irina.pdf>

As provided by the Copenhagen School securitization theory is comprised by speech act, acceptance of the audience and facilitating conditions or other non-securitizing actors contribute to a successful securitization. The causality or a one-way relationship between the speech act, the audience and securitizing actor, where politicians use the speech act first to justify exceptional measures, has been criticized by scholars, such as Balzacq. According to him, the one-directional relationship between the three factors, or some of them, is not the best approach. To fully grasp the dynamics, it will be more beneficial to “rather than looking for a one-directional relationship between some or all of the three factors highlighted, it could be profitable to focus on the degree of congruence between them. 26 Among other aspects of the Copenhagen School’s theoretical framework, which he criticizes, the thesis will rely on the criticism of the lack of context and the rejection of a ‘one-way causal’ relationship between the audience and the actor. The process of threat construction, according to him, can be clearer if external context, which stands independently from use of language, can be considered. 27 Balzacq opts for more context-oriented approach when it comes down to securitization through the speech act, where a single speech does not create the discourse, but it is created through a long process, where context is vital. 28 He indicates: In reality, the speech act itself, i.e. literally a single security articulation at a particular point in time, will at best only very rarely explain the entire social process that follows from it. In most cases a security scholar will rather be confronted with a process of articulations creating sequentially a threat text which turns sequentially into a securitization. 29 This type of approach seems more plausible in an empirical study, as it is more likely that a single speech will not be able to securitize an issue, but it is a lengthy process, where a the audience speaks the same language as the securitizing actors and can relate to their speeches.

#### ---Images of disasters are inevitable --- Only fostering imagery that rejects conflict & violence can prevent the utilization of imagery as a tool of war.

Paschalidis 1997

Gregory, of Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. “Images of War and the War of Images.” http://genesis.ee.auth.gr/dimakis/Gramma/7/06-paschalidis.htm

The choice, then, of the whole of the anti-war tradition of visual artists, photoreporters and activists of representing the suffering body as a way to expose the evils of war and establish a common ground of sensibility and understanding should seem now more clear and legitimate. If the beginnings of the modern humanistic tradition, in the Renaissance, were marked by the reinstatement of the dignity and the celebration of the beauty of the human body, it seems inevitable that the image of the degraded and defiled human body has since become the most potent symbol of everything that takes away from it and destroys its dignity and beauty, and thus, the most compelling incitation for ameliorative action. Ever since Leonardo and Goya, humanism is a quintessentially visual and at the same time embodied discourse, that constructs humanity as the most inclusive imagined community possible, through images that project a foundational, species identity centred on the human body. In the era of the generalized war of images brought about by the worldwide dissemination of the technical image, we are regularly confronted with images that instigate war and images that castigate war; images that legitimize war and images that reject and deny it; images that sublimate and glorify warfare and images that demystify and deglorify it; images that obscure its costs and obfuscate its grim reality, and images that expose the death, the destruction and the despair it causes; images that extoll the catastrophic potential of modern war technology, and images that focus on the insanity of it all; images that praise military virtue and patriotic duty, and images that testify to the courage of all those who oppose war, who resist violence and militarism. This war between war images is impossible to be won by restricting or avoiding them, or rejecting them all wholesale. This war can only be won by producing, by multiplying and by disseminating as much as possible, those images that castigate war, that expose its horror, that undermine the rhetoric and the ideologies that lead to it and legitimize it. The war against war involves, of course, much more than engaging in this war of images. We cannot possibly win the former, however, without having first prevailed in the latter.

#### Legal reforms restrain the cycle of violence and prevent error replication

Colm O’Cinneide 8, Senior Lecturer in Law at University College London, “Strapped to the Mast: The Siren Song of Dreadful Necessity, the United Kingdom Human Rights Act and the Terrorist Threat,” Ch 15 in Fresh Perspectives on the ‘War on Terror,’ ed. Miriam Gani and Penelope Mathew, <http://epress.anu.edu.au/war_terror/mobile_devices/ch15s07.html>

This ‘symbiotic’ relationship between counter-terrorism measures and political violence, and the apparently inevitable negative impact of the use of emergency powers upon ‘target’ communities, would indicate that it makes sense to be very cautious in the use of such powers. However, the impact on individuals and ‘target’ communities can be too easily disregarded when set against the apparent demands of the greater good. Justice Jackson’s famous quote in Terminiello v Chicago [111] that the United States Bill of Rights should not be turned into a ‘suicide pact’ has considerable resonance in times of crisis, and often is used as a catch-all response to the ‘bleatings’ of civil libertarians.[112] The structural factors discussed above that appear to drive the response of successive UK governments to terrorist acts seem to invariably result in a depressing repetition of mistakes.¶ However, certain legal processes appear to have some capacity to slow down the excesses of the counter-terrorism cycle. What is becoming apparent in the UK context since 9/11 is that there are factors at play this time round that were not in play in the early years of the Northern Irish crisis. A series of parliamentary, judicial and transnational mechanisms are now in place that appear to have some moderate ‘dampening’ effect on the application of emergency powers.¶ This phrase ‘dampening’ is borrowed from Campbell and Connolly, who have recently suggested that law can play a ‘dampening’ role on the progression of the counter-terrorism cycle before it reaches its end. Legal processes can provide an avenue of political opportunity and mobilisation in their own right, whereby the ‘relatively autonomous’ framework of a legal system can be used to moderate the impact of the cycle of repression and backlash. They also suggest that this ‘dampening’ effect can ‘re-frame’ conflicts in a manner that shifts perceptions about the need for the use of violence or extreme state repression.[113] State responses that have been subject to this dampening effect may have more legitimacy and generate less repression: the need for mobilisation in response may therefore also be diluted.

#### The massive national security apparatus built in the name of just war grows increasingly violent and secretive—we must attempt to speak about it if there is any hope for social justice.

Ayers and Tarrow 11 (Jeffrey Ayres is professor and chair of the Department of Political Science at Saint Michael’s College, and Sidney Tarrow is Professor Emeritus of Government at Cornell , FROM GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY TO GLOBAL WAR: A DECADE OF DISEQUILIBRIUM, http://essays.ssrc.org/10yearsafter911/from-global-civil-society-to-global-war-a-decade-of-disequilibrium/)

Ten years after 9/11, we also are struck by the marked imbalance in state–civil society relations, as we have just experienced a massive growth in the powers of the US government. This decade has witnessed the growth of an invisibly expanding web of non-military but partially militarized industries around Washington, DC. In a series of investigative articles, the Washington Post in July 2010 described the vast national-security apparatus created since 9/11, one that “has become so large, so unwieldy, and so secretive” that it “amounts to an alternative geography of the United States, a Top Secret America hidden from public view and lacking in thorough oversight.”5 Seven decades ago, political scientist Harold Lasswell worried about the growth of what he called the “garrison state.”6 Lasswell’s worry was not only the growth of the military and its increasing intrusion on what had been civilian functions of government; he was also concerned at the militarization of sectors of civilian society. According to Lasswell, writes Samuel Fitch, “In the twentieth century the political elite of industrial societies has become increasingly dominated by specialists in violence. These are typically not traditional military elites, but modern military professionals with extensive expertise in management, technical operations, and public relations. . . . National security therefore requires a conscious effort to maintain domestic morale and legitimates symbolic manipulation and coercion as necessary instruments for internal control.”7 The momentum of global activism and the potential for political agency also have receded against a backdrop of both seemingly unrelenting global economic turbulence and a resurgent US state that has intensified to an unprecedented degree its preparation for and practice of warfare. Writing in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, we did not anticipate the extra-constitutional ramifications of the Bush Doctrine: the operationalization of preventive war, extraordinary rendition, warrantless domestic surveillance, “enhanced interrogation,” presidential signing statements, and the legacy of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo. When we suggested somewhat hopefully that there was little need for pessimism—that globally oriented activists always worked most effectively on native ground, supported by the opportunities and resources of their home societies—we could never have expected that a Democratic president elected with a platform that rejected the Bush administration’s policies would further expand US military spending and counterterrorist overseas activity. The costs of this decade of the global War on Terror go beyond revived debates over the separation of powers and the entrenchment of the “Imperial Presidency.” It truly has been an unprecedented decade in many respects for the military-industrial complex. It is remarkable, for example, that the Pentagon’s budget has risen for thirteen consecutive years. Overall spending on defense between 2001 and 2009 increased by 70 percent, US defense spending over this decade rose from 30 percent to 50 percent of total worldwide defense spending, and US spending on defense averaged $250 billion more annually than it did during the height of the Cold War.8 A new 2011 report issued by Brown University’s Costs of War project estimates that ten years after the declaration of the War on Terror, the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan have cost approximately 225,000 lives and between $3.2 trillion and $4 trillion.9 And perhaps it will come as no surprise to anyone concerned about growing US indebtedness that the costs of the wars have been financed almost entirely by borrowing, with $185 billion in interest already paid on war spending and another $1 trillion in interest possibly accruing by 2020.10 And yet, the targets of the War on Terror only continue to expand—from Pakistan, to Somalia, to the Arabian Peninsula, particularly in Yemen—while the means of delivering reprisals against purported terrorists undergo further modernization. Indeed, it is the Obama administration’s penchant for increased use of drone warfare in growing numbers of asymmetrical conflicts that further distinguishes this past decade from earlier eras, especially the Cold War. Without underemphasizing the threat posed by Al-Qaeda, the dramatic increase in defense spending and the burgeoning costs of war are unprecedented, and drone warfare marks a further radical turn in the history of war. With little public discussion, the United States has further erased the boundaries of war’s beginning and end, as unmanned drone aircraft have now been used in airstrikes to kill suspected militants in at least six countries: Somalia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, Iraq, and Yemen.11 What we find especially troubling—beyond reports of increased loss of civilian lives along with those of the militants targeted in counterterrorist drone strikes—is the lack of sustained public debate over the many legal and moral questions surrounding drone warfare, as well as, more broadly, the major public-policy trade-offs associated with the construction of this national-security state. This escalating process of historically unprecedented spending, modernization, and expansion of US warfare, intelligence gathering, and surveillance capabilities is one of the more notable contributions to what we would call the “Great Disequilibrium.” By this term we refer to a palpable imbalance that has evolved in many different spheres of life today in the United States, a sense that we are missing counterbalancing forces that might respond correctively to trends and events that have destabilized the American regime and democratic process. The list is long (and herein not conclusive): the record length of and skyrocketing spending on warfare, including the unrestrained forays into extrajudicial killing via drone warfare; deepening inequality not seen since the 1920s, accompanied by growing poverty and increasing and near-record unemployment from the ongoing effects of the Great Recession; growing national indebtedness, crumbling infrastructure, decaying schools, spiraling higher-education costs, and declining public investment; and deteriorating federal and state government revenues at a time when the richest Americans (and multinationals) pay a considerably lower share of their incomes in taxes than at any time since World War II. Half a century ago, citizens looked to the state and to domestic actors and policies—political parties, the labor and civil rights movements, regulations supportive of social protections—as countervailing forces designed to limit national tendencies toward extreme economic or political disequilibrium. Today, in the midst of such visible deterioration in income, opportunity, and even national image, these countervailing forces are in retreat, with a surreal politics of theater playing out across the American political spectrum that exacerbates a growing democratic deficit. From the 2010 Supreme Court Citizens United ruling that removed barriers to massive corporate funding and manipulation of electoral campaigns, to cratering public confidence (especially toward Congress) in the capacity of our political parties and politicians to find meaningful solutions to the serious challenges facing the country, to the recent debate in Congress over raising the debt ceiling—where a tiny Tea Party minority provided cover to a Republican Party unwilling to compromise on any revenue increases despite widespread and significant public majority support—there is a gnawing sense that our political regime may no longer be up to the task of responding pragmatically to the myriad of challenges facing us in the twenty-first century. Is a New Transnational Politics Possible? On the eve of 9/11, while we remained somewhat skeptical, many observers held out great expectations that global democratic collective action would provide a new countervailing force to counter the inequities of globetrotting multinationals and fluid capital. In the age of neoliberal globalization, much faith was placed in an emerging constellation of global civil society forces as a new means for helping to recover citizen control over public life. We do recognize that there have been, over this past decade, remarkable changes in world politics as non-state actors, WikiLeaks networks, and communications technologies via Facebook and Twitter have challenged the primacy of the state in the international system. Yet, while arguably a more plural and differentiated international system is evolving, the developments in the United States since 9/11, the expanding War on Terror, and continued global economic turbulence have seemed to confirm our misgivings about the transformative potential of the global civil society project. For those who care about transnational activism, then, our reflections herein cannot hold out much hope. Yet here and there are stirrings from unexpected quarters that give us some hope for a possible renaissance of transnational activism. First, although the American wing of the global justice movement has been much weaker than advocates had expected, that movement is still lively in Western Europe and Latin America and shows signs of spreading to Africa, where two of the recent meetings of the World Social Forum have been held.12 Second, some observers have taken heart from the launching of an American wing of the World Social Forum, in Atlanta in 2007 and Detroit in 2010.13 Notably, the US Social Forum process in Detroit provided space for the organizational efforts of dozens of groups that formed the People’s Movement Assembly on Food Sovereignty—eventually evolving into the US Food Sovereignty Alliance—whose work today contributes to the transformative efforts of the transnational food movement to promote popular democratic control over the global food system.14Third, the extraordinary spread of digital media over the decade since we first wrote may have many—and contradictory—outcomes, but at a minimum, it is creating a new form of “connective action” alongside older forms of collective action based on social-movement organizations and NGOs.15 These may seem like thin reeds on which to build a new edifice of transnational organizing, but when we think of the surprisingly rapid transnational diffusion of the Middle Eastern and North African revolutions in early 2011, which have now toppled dictators from Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, we should be prepared for surprises.

#### Just war theorists have hijacked the academic and public discussion of war—we must reclaim it through deliberation.

Moore 01 (Thomas, An Australian Approach to ethic warfare?, War, Ethics and Justice: New Perspectives on a Post-9/11 World, google books, pg39)

The revival of just war theory in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks in the United States reveals the contradictory and contested nature of moral claims about violence within International Relations. If political scientists are often criticised for "fiddling while Rome burns' (Strauss 1962: 327) then the extensive revival of just war theory in public debates about armed intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrates the importance of moral reasoning in public deliberation about warfare and violence in International Relations. The extensive deployment of just war theory in the global war on terror raises signi- ficant questions about the contradictory relationship between political practice and political theory within the just war tradition. The strength of the just war tra-dition lies in its capacity to generate an understanding of the communitarian basis of modem militaries and how decisions about warfare are questions for deliberation within political community. Nonetheless, this instrumental view of just war theory thinks of just war as a rational body of conditions that must be satisfied in order to go to war (jus ad bellum) and in the fighting of war (jus in bello) This chapter examines the way in which parliamentary debate about the Iraqi intervention highlights the limitations of the just war theory as a public dis- course of warfare. A failure to examine the 'difficult questions' of just war theory within the official discourse of Australian foreign policy have revealed how the vocabulary of the just war tradition has become a 'permission slip’ for states in justifying the global war on terror. The 'difficult questions' of the just war tradition have been overlooked in the need to provide a moral justification for an intervention that was

#### ---Key to activism.

Veldman 2012

Robin Globus, doctoral candidate in the Religion and Nature program at the University of Florida, Narrating the Environmental Apocalypse, Ethics & the Environment, Volume 17, Number 1, Spring

Some of the strongest evidence of a connection between environmental apocalypticism and activism comes from a national survey that examined whether Americans perceived climate change to be dangerous. As part of his analysis, Anthony Leiserowitz identified several “interpretive communities,” which had consistent demographic characteristics but varied in their levels of risk perception. The group who perceived the risk to be the greatest, which he labeled “alarmists,” described climate change [End Page 5] using apocalyptic language, such as “Bad…bad…bad…like after nuclear war…no vegetation,” “Heat waves, it’s gonna kill the world,” and “Death of the planet” (2005, 1440). Given such language, this would seem to be a reasonable way to operationalize environmental apocalypticism. If such apocalypticism encouraged fatalism, we would expect alarmists to be less likely to have engaged in environmental behavior compared to groups with moderate or low levels of concern. To the contrary, however, Leiserowitz found that alarmists “were significantly more likely to have taken personal action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions” (ibid.) than respondents who perceived climate change to pose less of a threat. Interestingly, while one might expect such radical views to appeal only to a tiny minority, Leiserowitz found that a respectable eleven percent of Americans fell into this group (ibid). Further supporting Leiserowitz’s findings, in a separate national survey conducted in 2008, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, and Leiserowitz found that a group they labeled “the Alarmed” (again, due to their high levels of concern about climate change) “are the segment most engaged in the issue of global warming. They are very convinced it is happening, human-caused, and a serious and urgent threat. The Alarmed are already making changes in their own lives and support an aggressive national response” (2009, 3, emphasis added). This group was far more likely than people with lower levels of concern over climate change to have engaged in consumer activism (by rewarding companies that support action to reduce global warming with their business, for example) or to have contacted elected officials to express their concern. Additionally, the authors found that “[w]hen asked which reason for action was most important to them personally, the Alarmed were most likely to select preventing the destruction of most life on the planet (31%)” (2009, 31)—a finding suggesting that for many in this group it is specifically the desire to avert catastrophe, rather than some other motivation, that encourages pro-environmental behavior. Taken together, these and other studies (cf. Semenza et al. 2008 and DerKarabetia, Stephenson, and Poggi 1996) provide important evidence that many of those who think environmental problems pose a severe threat practice some form of activism, rather than giving way to fatalistic resignation. National surveys give a good overview of the association between apocalypticism and activism among the general public, but they do not [End Page 6] provide sufficient ethnographic detail. To complement this broader picture I now turn to case studies, which provide greater insight into how adherents themselves understand what motivates their environmental behavior. When seeking a subset of environmentalists with apocalyptic beliefs, the radical wing is an obvious place to look. For example, many Earth First!ers believe that the collapse of industrial society is inevitable (Taylor 1994). At the same time, the majority are actively committed to preventing ecological disaster. As Earth First! co-founder Howie Wolke acknowledged, the two are directly connected: “As ecological calamity unravels the living fabric of the Earth, environmental radicalism has become both common and necessary” (1989, 29).3 This logic underlies efforts to preserve wilderness areas, which many radical environmentalists believe will serve as reservoirs of genetic diversity, helping to restore the planet after industrial society collapses (Taylor 1994). In addition to encouraging activism to preserve wilderness, apocalyptic beliefs also motivate practices such as “monkeywrenching,” or ecological sabotage, civil disobedience, and the more conventional “paper monkeywrenching” (lobbying, engaging in public information campaigns to shift legislative priorities, or using lawsuits when these tactics fail). Ultimately, while there are disagreements over what strategies will best achieve their desired goals, for most radical environmentalists, apocalypticism and activism are bound closely together. The connection between belief in impending disaster and environmental activism holds true for Wiccans as well. During fieldwork in the southeastern United States, for example, Shawn Arthur reported meeting “dozens of Wiccans who professed their apocalyptic millenarian beliefs to anyone who expressed interest, yet many others only quietly agreed with them without any further elaboration” (2008, 201). For this group, the coming disaster was understood as divine retribution, the result of an angry Earth Goddess preparing to punish humans for squandering her ecological gifts (Arthur 2008, 203). In light of Gaia’s impending revenge, Arthur found that Wiccans advocated both spiritual and material forms of activism. For example, practices such as Goddess worship, the use of herbal remedies for healing, and awareness of the body and its energies were considered important for initiating a more harmonious relationship with the earth (Arthur 2008, 207). As for material activism, Arthur notes [End Page 7] that the notion of environmental apocalypse played a key role in encouraging pro-environmental behavior: images of immanent [sic] ecological crisis and apocalyptic change often were utilized as motivating factors for developing an environmentally and ecologically conscious worldview; for stressing the importance of working for the Earth through a variety of practices, including environmental activism, garbage collecting, recycling, composting, and religious rituals; for learning sustainable living skills; and for developing a special relationship with the world as a divine entity. (2008, 212) What these studies and my own experiences in the environmentalist milieu4 suggest is that people who make a serious commitment to engaging in environmentally friendly behavior, people who move beyond making superficial changes to making substantial and permanent ones, are quite likely to subscribe to some form of the apocalyptic narrative. All this is not to say that apocalypticism directly or inevitably causes activism, or that believing catastrophe is imminent is the only reason people become activists. However, it is to say that activism and apocalypticism are associated for some people, and that this association is not arbitrary, for there is something uniquely powerful and compelling about the apocalyptic narrative. Plenty of people will hear it and ignore it, or find it implausible, or simply decide that if the situation really is so dire there is nothing they can do to prevent it from continuing to deteriorate. Yet to focus only on the ability of apocalyptic rhetoric to induce apathy, indifference or reactance is to ignore the evidence that it also fuels quite the opposite—grave concern, activism, and sometimes even outrage. It is also to ignore the movement’s history. From Silent Spring (Carson [1962] 2002) to The Limits to Growth (Meadows et al 1972) to The End of Nature (McKibben 1989), apocalyptic arguments have held a prominent place within environmental literature, topping best-seller lists and spreading the message far and wide that protecting the environment should be a societal priority. Thus, while it is not a style of argument that will be effective in convincing everyone to commit to the environmental cause (see Feinberg and Willer 2011), there does appear to be a close relationship between apocalyptic belief and activism among a certain minority. The next section explores the implications of that relationship further. [End Page 8]

## 1AR

### Policy Response Key

#### Perm do both – policy is responsive and even if the alt is coopted it’s the only way to solve.

Kurki 2011

Milja, The Limitations of the Critical Edge: Reflections on Critical and Philosophical IR Scholarship Today, Principal Investigator of ‘Political Economies of Democratisation’, a European Research Council-funded project based at the International Politics Department, Aberystwyth University, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 40(1) 129–146 September 2011

We have yet another call to a new beginning, another meta-theoretical debate for the consumers of international relations theory. This is the easy part, and I support it as far as it goes. However, now it is time to move beyond introductions and openings to concrete applications, to the construction and illustration of viable alternatives. It is important that we proceed in this manner not because these alternatives are necessarily going to be ‘better’, closer to ‘truth’ or more ‘real’ in some sense than prevailing theoretical explanations; but in order to demonstrate the possibility of alternative – possibly, but not necessarily, superior – conceptualisations, that are otherwise widely held to be self-evident by the vast majority of scholars of IR.53 There have been many calls for more critical and philosophical debate in IR; yet, just how critical are all these debates and what effects do they have? What is the purpose of critical IR theory or philosophical reflection, and what is the purpose of the supposed theoretical diversity that the critical voices bring into IR? Many, in my view, misunderstand their purpose. Biersteker summarises my own view perfectly. The point of philosophical reflection and post-positivism, he argues, is not to provide ‘pluralism without purpose, but a critical pluralism, designed to reveal embedded power and authority structures, provoke critical scrutiny of dominant discourses, engage marginalised peoples and perspectives and provide a basis for alternative conceptualisations’.54 There is a purpose to critical theory that needs to be acknowledged, reflected upon and ‘practised’; both inside and outside academia. At present, it seems to me that relatively little such engagement takes place; not because critical theorists are ‘lazy’ or wrong-headed, but because the disciplinary environment and professional structures favour disassociation and depoliticisation even of these strands of thought. Strategic thinking of critical theorists is not missing, but it is oriented in such a way that does not facilitate real-world political changes. In the era of the expansion of the image of homo oeconomicus in academia too, much remains to be done in reinvigorating critical theoretical thought. At present, we have many theoretically sophisticated but practically disinvested scholars. This renders IR, and especially philosophical and critical theory within it, rather useless in challenging global structures and paradigms of domination. But what can we do about this? Arguably, revisions of conceptual categories and their political underpinnings, as well as spaces to think about alternatives, are needed more than ever. But how do we generate them, or, in Cox’s or Murphy’s words, how can IR academics help in generating such alternatives? We can do so in a few ways. We can do so by passing on the torch by continuing to teach critical theory: as Hoffman usefully reminds us, theorising itself (and passing it on through teaching) is a critical practice in itself.55 We can also do so today by continuing to fight the cuts to social science research in universities and the constriction of space for free thought within universities. We can also seek to obtain, but also seek to reshape, the kind of research funding that is provided by funding councils or states. This takes some perseverance, for it is not easy to argue for conceptual or philosophical engagement, let alone critical praxaeology, at a time of crisis or for reform within bureaucratic and conservative structures. Yet, this brings in another core aspect of the challenge faced by critical theorists, which is that we must also seek to engage with the world: to act in it as well as analyse it. We must engage the social groups and NGOs, but also the elites and bureaucrats. We can do so and we must try and do so; partly because these elites (and also NGO elites) are actually more well-meaning and even reflective than many academics give them credit for; and because, in my experience, they are very capable of understanding both the pros and cons, limits and possibilities, of alternative frameworks and actions when concretely presented with them. This is not to say that significant structural and ideological constraints do not exist to generating alternative political scenarios – they do – but the structures are only partly, and in many cases only secondarily, supported, even by governmental or intergovernmental elites. These elites may be a good ally, rather than an enemy, in re-shifting international political and economic paradigms. The result of a new kind of engagement with the empirical and the practical is not necessarily a victory of critical theory; critical theory rarely – indeed never, it would seem – ‘wins’, that much is a clear lesson of history. Yet, it can occasionally activate, motivate and, indeed, ‘enthral’ people, as well as giving them hope and impetus to achieve change. Despite its sceptical outlook, critical and philosophical theory is still valuable in reminding us that, while it does not seem so, we do not live in a world without any alternatives.

### XT- Spills Over

Anti-war activism is a gateway to all other forms of social activism- it’s a key entry point for all social justice.

Heaney and Rojas-prof organizational studies and sociology, Indiana-12 (Antiwar Politics and Paths of Activist Participation on the Left, <http://www.indiana.edu/~workshop/papers/rojas_working%20paper.pdf>)

Leslie Cagan is a stalwart of the antiwar movement. Born in 1947, she was raised by an activist family and attended "Ban the Bomb" rallies in the 1950s. As a college student at New York University, she was the key organizer for her campus' sizeable delegation to the October 1967 March on the Pentagon. Cagan was a lead organizer of an anti-nuclear rally in Central Park that was attended by hundreds of thousands of people and was National Coordinator of the National Campaign for Peace in the Middle East during the Persian Gulf War in 1990-1991. With the anticipation of a new war in Iraq, Cagan became National Coordinator of United for Peace and Justice in 2002, the nation's largest and broadest peace coalition during the presidency of George W. Bush, a role that she filled until 2009 (Cagan 2008). Despite Cagan's impeccable credentials as an antiwar activist, it would be a mistake to think of her only as an antiwar activist. She has managed political campaigns and been active in other social movements, such as the lesbian-gay rights movement and the campaign to normalize U.S. relations with Cuba (Hedges 2003). Like many peace activists, Cagan steered her efforts toward other causes during times of relative peacetime. Yet her antiwar stance informs these efforts: "the undercurrent of it all is that . . . sense that without peace, and until there is peace, it'll be virtually impossible to really bring full economic justice, social justice? (Cagan 2008). Like Cagan, many other antiwar activists bring peace frames to their involvement in other movementse (Carroll and Ratner 1996). Activism changes people's lives (McAdam 1989). Previous scholarship has demonstrated that the paths that people take into and through activism affect how their lives are changed (Blee 2011; Fisher 2006; Fisher and McInerney 2012; Han 2009; Munson 2010; Viterna 2006). For example, how people are recruited into activism (Fisher 2006; Fisher and McInerney 2012) and the organizations that they join (Han 2009; Munson 2008) makes a difference for how long they remain involved in activism and what types of activities they engage in. These studies, however, have failed to distinguish between movements in terms of how participation in one movement may influence an individual’s activist path differently than participation in another movement. Activists live in a world of multiple, interacting social movements (Evans and Kay 2008; Isaac and Christiansen 2002; Isaac, McDonald, and Lukasik 2006; McAdam 1995; Minkoff 1997; Voss and Sherman 2000; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Meyer and Tarrow 1998; Meyer and Whittier 1994). In this article, we examine the paths that activists navigate in switching from movement to movement over time. In particular, we argue that antiwar activists pursue distinctive paths in comparison to other progressive activists. This article proceeds, first, by considering the extant scholarship on paths to and through activism. Second, it argues that antiwar activists are likely to pursue paths that diverge from those of other progressive activists. Third, it examines the methods and rationale for conducting a survey of 691 activists who attended the 2010 US Social Forum, one of the largest assemblies of progressive activists in the United States. Fourth, it explains sequence analysis as an approach to analyzing data on activist paths. Fifth, it demonstrates the distinctiveness of antiwar activists? paths using regression analysis. The article concludes by explaining the aggregate consequences that these paths they have for the broader environment of progressive activists.

#### Highlighting the compatability between movements is key—the permutation makes it more likely that people join up with their struggle.

Heaney and Rojas-prof organizational studies and sociology, Indiana-12 (Antiwar Politics and Paths of Activist Participation on the Left, <http://www.indiana.edu/~workshop/papers/rojas_working%20paper.pdf>)

These studies suggest that scholars should more systematically examine how individual activists navigate a social world where activists may move among policy domains. Entry into activism through one movement gives an individual access to a larger array of allied movements. It is natural to then ask about the factors that encourage activists to switch or combine issues and the outcomes associated with particular activism trajectories. The rest of this paper examines activism trajectories, which we define as the temporal sequence of participation in one or more movements. That is, an "activist trajectory" is a list of the movements that someone has joined over time. Some trajectories may be simple; an activist may prefer to participate in immigration rallies and nothing else. Other trajectories may be highly complex. An activist may have begun their political career by joining a civil rights movement march in the 1960s, then joined a women's group in the early 1970s. Later, the activist may have moved away from civil rights altogether and joined an immigration rights organization in the 1980s. Multiple studies of activist biographies (Jasper 1999; Carroll and Ratner 1996; Heaney and Rojas 2010) show that a substantial group of people migrate among movements or simultaneously participate in multiple movements. We consider two questions about activist trajectories. First, how does initial mobilization affect a subsequent activism trajectory? In other words, does it matter how an activist got involved in politics? Entry into activism may affect a subsequent trajectory through numerous mechanisms. The recruiting movement may have a relatively central position in the wider social movement field. Some movements may have many connections to other movements. For example, historical and sociological accounts of the civil rights movement have documented its many overlaps with the women’s rights movement, the Vietnam War movement, and others (e.g., Minkoff 1997) . In contrast, some movements may have a more circumscribed role. Bearman and Everett’s (1993) study of Washington, DC organizations also showed that some movements occupied more peripheral positions in activist networks. Thus, entry through more central movements would be associated with trajectories where activists associate with many different movements.